







Hands Off Our Jouissance 
The Collaborative Risk of a  
Shared Disorganization 
 





Do we really mean to take shelter from our jouissance in 
the order of utility, to become “a branch of the service of 
goods,” in the mistaken hope that the “human sciences” 
will be rewarded for doing so? 
L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Group Time, Catastrophe, 
Periodicity” 
 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple . . . . It was 
curiosity—the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is 
worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the 
curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for 
one to know, but that which enables one to get free of 
oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion 
for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and 
to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of 
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himself? There are times in life when the question of 
knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, 
and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely nec-
essary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. . . . 
[W]hat is philosophy today . . . if it is not the critical 
work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does 
it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to 
what extent it might be possible to think differently, in-
stead of legitimating what is already known? 
Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure 
 
We are beings who can neither live nor die without art-
ful signification. 




I SIT IN ONE OF THE DIVES / ON FIFTY-SECOND STREET / 
UNCERTAIN AND AFRAID 
 
In 1981, Michel Foucault gave an interview in the French 
gay press, Le gai pied (he had mistakenly believed his 
identity would be cloaked, but the interview concluded 
with “Merci, Michel Foucault”), in which he freely sketched out 
what he saw as homosexuality’s “historic occasion to reopen 
affective and relational virtualities, not so much through 
the instrinsic qualities of the homosexual, but due to the 
biases against the position he occupies; in a certain sense, 
diagonal lines that he can trace in the social fabric permit 
him to make these virtualities visible” (Foucault 1996a, 
311). More important, Foucault believed, than the ques-
tions of “who am I?” and “what is the secret of my de-
sire?” would be to ask, “What relations, through homosexu-
ality, can be established, invented, multiplied, and modulated?” 
(Foucault 1996a, 308). It is important to note that, for 
Foucault, the possibly utopic potential of homosexuality 
would be available to anyone, gay or straight or whatever, 
who might experiment with new “affective intensities,” new 
friendships, and new modes of living that could “yield intense 




relations not resembling those that are institutionalized” (Fou-
cault 1996a, 310). 
 It was at this same time, and following from his ongo-
ing work on the history of sexuality (but with what can be 
described as a significant, and often overlooked, detour 
within that work),1 that Foucault became interested in re-
habilitating ascesis, and ascetics, as a practice of the care 
of the self: 
 
the work that one performs on oneself in order to 
transform oneself or make the self appear which, 
happily, one never attains. Can that be our prob-
lem today? We’ve rid ourselves of asceticism. Yet 
it’s up to us to advance into a homosexual ascesis 
that would make us work on ourselves and in-
vent—I do not say discover—a manner of being 
that is still improbable. (Foucault 1996a, 309–
310)2 
 
Foucault was at pains in many of his lectures to distin-
guish care of the self from knowledge of the self (i.e., the 
Delphic dictum: “know thyself”), partly because he did 
not believe in an ascetic praxis in which the ultimate aim 
was to “discover” and perhaps also regulate, surpass, and 
even renounce a self that was always already there (a pre-
occupation of later Christian culture, to be sure); rather, 
ascesis would name a set of practices or daily exercises (as 
in late classical Stoicism) aimed at what David Halperin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Davidson (1994), Deleuze (1986), and Tuh-
kanen (2005/06). 
2 In 1981, when Foucault gave this interview, he had already 
embarked on a series of lectures that he would continue (until 
his untimely and tragic death in 1984) at the Collège de France, 
the University of Vermont, UC-Berkeley, New York University, 
and other sites on the hermeneutics of the subject, technologies 
of the self, care of the self, and freedom; see Martin at al. (1988), 
Foucault (1996b), Foucault (1999), Foucault (2001), and Fou-
cault (2005).  
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has described as a continual process of becoming-queer: 
“an identity without an essence, not a given condition but 
a horizon of possibility, an opportunity for self-trans-
formation, a queer potential” (Halperin 1995, 79). One 
never arrives at the self, but instead, continuously works 
upon processes of self-transformation. This is, important-
ly, an aesthetic project, an “art of living,” a “style of life,” a 
tekhnē aimed at producing a self-always-becoming as a 
“beautiful and good work” (Foucault 2005, 424). 
 This work upon the self that one “happily never at-
tains,” which is also a concern for and care of the self, has 
something to do with freedom as well—a term not often 
associated with Foucault’s thought, especially by those 
who oversimplify his entire ouevre as being only about 
the ways in which various structures and techniques of 
power produce knowledge and individuals, with appar-
ently no escape route out of the power-knowledge nexus. 
And yet much of Foucault’s late writings were precisely 
concerned with “the definition of practices of freedom” 
and ethics as “the conscious practice of freedom” (Fou-
cault 1996b, 433, 434)—with freedom here to be distin-
guished from the idea of liberation (the setting free of 
selves that have supposedly always been there and were 
simply repressed, in hiding, etc.). For Foucault, freedom 
was “the ontological condition of ethics” and ethics is 
“the form that freedom takes when it is informed by re-
flection” (Foucault 1996b, 435).3 And what this also means is 
that, for Foucault (as well as the late classical writers, such 
as Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, whom he was 
reading at the time), ethics is a practice (an ascetics, or set 
of exercises) of freedom that revolves around the funda-
mental imperative: “Take care of yourself.” One of the 
tragedies, I would argue, of social and cultural life in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is important to note here that, for Foucault, as for the an-
cient Greek writers he was studying, an ethos named modes of 
being and behavior—of living—as opposed to naming some sort 
of prescriptive morality. 
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present (and of gay life, more narrowly), is that we have 
never really taken up, collectively, Foucault’s call to work 
on ourselves in order to invent improbable manners of 
being, new modes and styles of living, polymorphous 
affective intensities, and new relational virtualities and 
friendships. Instead, as Joshua Glenn has written, 
 
[e]verything today encourages us to see the dark 
side, the folly, the impossibility, not just of utopia 
but of an anti-anti-utopian social order where we’d have 
a project in common besides selling our commodi-
fied labor, intellectual or otherwise. Everything en-
courages us to think we face a choice between de-
tached houses in a row, where we cook our din-
ners in private, or else the gulag. . . . Sure, the 
company of misfits would make you feel bad 
sometimes; but it also feels bad to have nothing to 
look forward to but marriage, work and TV. (Glenn 
2009) 
 
Some of us have devoted much of our lives to cultivating 
new relational modes and the company of misfits (an 
agonistic yet joyful venture, to be sure, in which we exult 
in the exquisite difficulties of becoming-with-others), but 
when I re-read Foucault’s 1981 interview, as I often do, I 
mourn that, as Adam Phillips has written, we have “not 
had the courage of [our] narcissism”—we have not found 
“a version of narcissism that is preservative at once of 
survival and pleasure,” which “would be to have the cour-
age of one’s wish for more life rather than less” (Phillips 
2008, 98). 
 
ACCURATE SCHOLARSHIP / CAN UNEARTH THE WHOLE OF-
FENCE / FROM LUTHER UNTIL NOW / THAT HAS DRIVEN A 
CULTURE MAD 
 
It can be argued that the entire oeuvre of Aranye Fraden-
burg has been concerned with this sort of courage for 
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“more life rather than less” (with all of its attendant risks, 
its sufferings as well as its joys), and with the sort of queer 
work that Foucault called for—this “techne” or disciplin-
ing of the self as a “beautiful and good work”—and more-
over, with this care of the self, and thus her work, “com-
posed of eros and dust,” has served as a sort of lighthouse 
for Auden’s “affirming flame.”4 This work (this career) 
culminates now in Staying Alive, a book that can be de-
scribed in précis as an elegant and erudite defense of the 
humanities (and more largely, of the public university, 
with all of its ruly and unruly knowledge disciplines) as 
the very site par excellence of the practices of the care of 
the self, and of other selves (for Fradenburg, as literary-
historical scholar and psychoanalyst, attends more than Fou-
cault ever did to the arts of intersubjectivity and therapeu-
tic care that contribute to a more general eudaimonia, or 
flourishing). This is to speak, as Fradenburg does here 
and elsewhere, of the university as reservoir and genera-
tor of styles of living and selves (and groups) as works of 
art and desiring-assemblages (ever contingent packs and 
multiplicities, always on the move, and creating “break-
flows out of which desire” continuously pours forth),5 
without which, our lives (intellectual and personal, and 
who can tell the difference sometimes?) would be vastly 
impoverished.  
 Indeed, there has been no voice within premodern studies 
more insistent on the subject of the ways in which disciplinarity, 
desire, enjoyment, work, groupification, and care of the self 
intersect in always risky (and even melancholy), yet neces-
sary and productive fashion, and with the ways in which 
aesthetics, signifying, intersubjectivity (intimate and ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 From W.H. Auden, “September 1, 1939”: “Defenseless under 
the night / Our world in stupor lies; / Yet, dotted everywhere, / 
Ironic points of light / Flash out wherever the Just /Exchange 
their messages: / May I, composed like them / Of Eros and of 
dust, / Beleaguered by the same / Negation and despair, / Show 
an affirming flame” (Auden 1979, 95–97).  
5 Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 37. 
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timate), and self- and world-building are importantly 
enmeshed. Fradenburg’s work has never been just about 
medieval studies, although it may appear as such to 
some—rather, it has always concerned itself with living 
and enduring, with creaturely attachments to meaning-
making as a form of thriving and flourishing, as well as 
with the ways in which institutional and disciplinary life 
(university life) are bound up with desires that are “unac-
countable” and “always on the move” (Fradenburg 2002b, 64), 
despite all of the attempts of the university’s managerial 
technocrats (and methodologically uptight scholars) to 
say otherwise. Fradenburg insists that we can never fully 
know ourselves (personally or institutionally), and there-
fore unknowing becomes (has to become) an important 
component of what we do in here. In this sense, Fraden-
burg’s entire body of work fleshes out what Geoffrey 
Bennington has claimed (by way of Derrida) is the prima-
ry work of the University—that it has “a responsibility to 
foster events of thought that cannot fail to unsettle the 
University in its Idea of itself” (Bennington 2010, 28; see 
also Derrida 2002). Indeed, the future (our personal fu-
tures, our group futures, our institutional futures) is not 
really possible without not knowing for sure, and as Fra-
denburg argues further, 
 
To be able to anticipate, plan, project a future or 
into a future, we have to not know for sure, be-
cause we have to suspend judgment even while ex-
ercising it, knowing that we don’t know (every-
thing). Ethics—and ultimately psychoanalysis—
emerges from a willing of this suspension, a para-
doxical knowing of non-knowing. (Fradenburg 
2009, 96; my emphasis) 
 
Fradenburg’s work is, pace Bennington, an “event of 
thought” that draws important attention to “the contin-
gency and changefulness of living” (Fradenburg 2011a,  
596), and outside of premodern studies, her thinking and 
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writing sits alongside the work of theorists such as Lauren 
Berlant whose work pays important attention to “the 
emotional time of being-with, time where it is possible to 
value floundering around with others whose attention-
paying to what’s happening is generous and makes live-
ness possible as a good, not a threat” (Berlant 2011, 85–
86).6  
 Refusing to jettison loose and fuzzy pleasures in favor 
of a supposedly austerely rigorous disciplinarity (where 
one opts for supposedly objective truths over subjective, 
or increasingly, intersubjective feelings and pleasures) and vice 
versa, Fradenburg has insisted in her work, over and over 
again, that enjoyment and disciplinarity have a critical 
relationship, one that we who are situated within the uni-
versity decouple at our peril. As she wrote in her book 
Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer, 
 
Discipline does not teach us the identity of pleas-
ure with the good; rather, it drags desire out into 
the open, pours gasoline on it, and sets it on fire, 
which is why it so easily becomes desire’s object as 
well as its means. (Fradenburg 2002b, 7) 
 
For Fradenburg, the “passional and technical coincide in 
the register of our jouissance,” and most importantly, dis-
cipline “enhances jouissance; it multiples and extends its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I would note here, too, as an aside, that Fradenburg’s more 
recent focus on the ways in which scientific method and the 
humanistic arts of interpretation, as she writes in this volume, 
“actually enhance one another (in practical as well as theoretical 
ways),” admirably takes up Abraham Maslow’s call in the 1960s 
for “rehumanizing (and trans-humanizing) science” and for 
biology to “shake itself loose from a pure physical-chemical re-
ductiveness” (Maslow 1966, ii). Indeed, what Staying Alive 
demonstrates is that, more recently, the sciences themselves, 
such as neuroscience, are “now establishing, however (at times) 
unintentionally, the importance of artistic and humanist train-
ing to mental functioning.” 
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possibilities, its potential for the remaking of identities” 
(Fradenburg 2002b, 252, 7).7 Put another way, desire and 
the sorts of passions and compulsions that lead to certain 
intensely ecstatic experiences are integral to the work of 
the academy, which often does not admit the importance 
of (disorganized) subjective life to its “proper objects” of 
study. I use the term “disorganized” here purposefully, 
and have lifted it from Lauren Berlant’s essay “Starved” 
(cited above), where Berlant writes that what we are 
“starved” for right now (in social life) is not necessarily 
sex or romantic intimacy, but something like sex, or like 
affect—in short, “the collaborative risk of a shared disor-
ganization” (Berlant 2011, 86). We might reflect, too, that 
the university is one important form of social life—it is 
not just a place where we study, think, and develop 
knowledge apart from our “real lives.” The university is a 
form of life, a habitus, and we live (and desire and ago-
nize) there with others. As Donna Beth Ellard writes in 
this volume, the university can sometimes “feel as inac-
cessible as a luxury estate in Montecito,” yet Fradenburg’s 
work here in this volume “offers theory and praxis for 
staying alive, personally and professionally, by encourag-
ing living practices that double as reading practices.” 
 Within the setting of the university, with its disciplines that 
often jostle against and compete with each other for ever-
dwindling resources, and within specific disciplines them-
selves, where different groups of scholars often square off 
against each other over methodological and other divides, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In Sacrifice Your Love, Fradenburg defines jouissance (an al-
most unbearable intensity that is also a transgressive excess of 
pleasure) this way: “Jouissance is the point at which pleasure and 
pain crisscross, when there are no more objects, and the only 
thing left for desire to desire is the unknowable beyond of insen-
tience. With the loss of its objects, the I also loses its self-
presence—or, at least, the vulnerability of its self-presence be-
comes felt experience. Pleasure protects us from jouissance by 
delivering as much jouissance as the I can bear and still be there 
to bear it” (Fradenburg 2002b, 18). 
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Fradenburg’s thinking becomes vitally important for see-
ing how 
 
[g]roup desire makes what we call knowledge. There is 
no other kind of knowledge than this; this is what 
knowledge is and we make it. It is neither illusory 
nor objective; it is an artifact, carefully crafted, 
tested, debated, within groups, between groups, 
over time, and across cultures. (Fradenburg 2002b, 
10; her emphasis) 
 
Because of the ways in which Fradenburg has always in-
sisted on the productive (if also agonistic) enmeshment of 
desire and discipline, I catch in her writings an echo with 
Jonathan Lear’s argument, in “Eros and Unknowing” (a 
beautiful reading of Plato’s Symposium), that we should 
not, in our intellectual life, “leave the human realm be-
hind,” but should  
 
get deeper into it—its smells, feels, textures, and 
the imaginary feelings we give to them. Whatever 
‘higher’ or ‘deeper’ meanings there may be, they 
do not transcend human life, but lie immanent in 
it. The body, its drives, and the bodily expression 
of mind all lend vitality to ‘higher’ mental func-
tions and to social life. It is to this particular sub-
jectivity with which we are pregnant; and it is from 
this that we give birth in beauty. (Lear 1998, 166) 
  
As Fradenburg herself has more recently argued, “The 
embodied, and therefore affective, nature of cognition is 
not a figment of the psychoanalytic imagination, but is 
asserted everywhere in contemporary neuroscience.” As 
to beauty, and its importance, “[a]esthetic form is a spell-
binding (or not) attempt to transmit and circulate affect, 
without which not much happens at all” (Fradenburg 
2010, 66). Further, aesthetic experience “is grounded in, 
indeed is the ground of, ‘attachment,’ and we do not be-
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come ‘human’ without it” (Fradenburg 2010, 67). 
 In addition to demonstrating, throughout her work, 
the ways in which knowledge is shaped by the continual 
(and risky) dance between enjoyment (affect, feeling, and 
drive) and discipline (the rigors and constraints of study 
and work), especially with relation to the work of the sig-
nifier and signification (the primary matter of the hu-
manities, but also of the biological sciences),8 Fraden-
burg’s work has also everywhere affirmed (perhaps in a 
lighter mood) the importance of play, over necessity, as 
the mother of invention (see, for example, Fradenburg 
2011a, 597), where “[p]lay is about signifying and there-
fore about becoming,” and becoming “in turn is about 
process, in particular about processes of transformation 
of states of mind and body” (Fradenburg 2011b, 57). Fur-
ther,  
 
Interpretation and relationality depend on one 
another because all relationships are unending processes 
of interpretation and expression, listening and signi-
fying.  In turn, sentience assists relationality: we can’t 
thrive and probably can’t survive without minds open 
to possibility, capable of sensing and interpreting 
the tiniest shifts in, e.g., pitch and tone. (Fraden-
burg 2011a, 602) 
 
Ultimately, “[p]lasticity, stylistics, enrichment are not 
embellishments of living process but are inherent in it” 
(Fradenburg 2011b, 45), and thus the humanities play an 
important role in helping us to develop certain arts of 
living and aliveness that not only allow us to want more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Fradenburg puts it in Sacrifice Your Love, “our jouissance 
extends itself by means of the signifier’s power to (re)distribute 
life and death” (Fradenburg 2002b, 63). And in “Living Chau-
cer” she reminds us that, “scientific signifiers have the same 
wayward intersubjective, intertextual, intergenerational lives as 
do ‘literary’ signifiers” (Fradenburg 2011b, 47). 
xii JOY: HANDS OFF OUR JOUISSANCE 
	  
rather than less life, but also help us to develop a reper-
toire for what Sara Ahmed has called “the politics of the 
hap,” which is “about opening up possibilities for being in 
other ways, of being perhaps,” and about working “toward 
a world in which things can happen in alternative ways” 
(Ahmed 2010, 222; my emphasis). This is a critically im-
portant project in an era where neoliberal capital turns 
our dreams and other forms of resistance into commodi-
ties in the space of a nanosecond, and where our every 
move is surveyed, digitized, and sold as data to whoever 
wants to purchase the information necessary to plot our 
moves in advance of our arrival at desires we no longer 
own. Should the university not be, on some level, a haven 
for resistance to such techno-capture of every aspect of 
our lives? Will success (and happiness) only be measured 
by the dollars we pile up and the gadgets for distraction 
we accumulate, or shall we wish, rather, for a laboratory-
imaginarium in which one’s life (and all of knowledge) 
undergoes processes of invention and re-invention (with-
out end) in the company of like-minded seekers who val-
ue surprise and unsettlement over certain answers? Such 
is one image, for me, of an ideal university, and while few 
would argue that the university today is not broken in 
some sense (it is not ideal, in other words, in Fraden-
burg’s or anyone else’s terms), as Michael Snediker writes 
in this volume, Fradenburg’s emphasis on “our swerving 
attention to the fuzzy world we’re making takes some 
sting out of this being the case.” 
 It is important to note here as well that, for Fraden-
burg, the university—and the humanities, more particu-
larly—is a shared, intersubjective project, and the signifier 
(for example, poetry) has played no little part in a form of 
sociability (and even companionability) that is critical for 
self-transformation and progressive social change: “sym-
bols enable living process” and what “enables us to risk 
change is the feeling that we are understood and (there-
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fore) accompanied” (Fradenburg 2011b, 45, 60).9 As Fra-
denburg has argued in many places, play and shared at-
tention are so important to so many species, including 
humans, that they may even be an end in themselves, and 
this is something the humanities and sciences have in 
common that they do not always readily acknowledge or 
see. As Ruth Evans explains about Fradenburg’s method 
in this volume, “[i]t’s not a choice between a scientific 
explanation on the one hand and a semiotic one on the 
other; we need both.” We might call this sort of play and 
shared ludic attention learning, or the university: the end-
less (playful, but also at times, sorrowful) processes we 
must commit ourselves to, with their open-ended and 
poetic and rowdy mutliplicity of perspectives, and their 
cultivation of the non-utilitarian arts of life, which may 
have more to do with personal and social well-being than 
we have previously imagined. Or, as Daniel Remein 
writes in this volume, “Many artifacts indeed do repre-
sent, or mimic, or encode—but some ornaments just dec-
orate, an appointment for which they are no less needful 
in the physical wonder of sentience.” For these, and many 
other reasons, Fradenburg’s work has long hailed us to a 
cross-temporal pedagogical-artistic project that asks us, 
not just to innovate our scholarship accordingly, but to 
reclaim the humanities itself as the site of desire and 
knowledge, of care and attachment, of new relational 
modes, and thus, of love itself. Put another way, her work 
creates a space similar to the meeting-places of the cities 
of ancient philosophy, such as the banquet hall in Plato’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It should be noted here as well that the longest possible histori-
cal perspectives upon processes of signification (such as those 
crafted by Fradenburg in her work as a premodernist) are criti-
cal, for as she has also written, “Signifiers are remarkably muta-
ble, but they can also be very persistent—and persistent does not 
mean timeless. Signifiers enable repetitions, revivals, and resur-
gences; they mark the spot where things have gone missing, 
hence where we begin to look for them (again)” (Fradenburg 
2009, 89). 
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Symposium, which “are the sites of a metaphysical socia-
bility sympathetic to the beneficent madness of love” 
(Bersani 2008, 81). 
 
DEFENCELESS UNDER THE NIGHT / OUR WORLD IN STUPOR 
LIES; / YET, DOTTED EVERYWHERE, / IRONIC POINTS OF 
LIGHT FLASH OUT 
 
The three terms most richly productive (and ubiquitous) 
in Fradenburg’s work of the past fifteen or so years—even 
as she has moved from a focus on literary narrative and 
poetics (especially Chaucer) and on “discontinuist” histo-
ries (national, courtly, aesthetic, sexual, queer, psycho-
analytic, and so on) to what I would call a more public 
intellectual mode of writing about the arts more broadly, 
under the aegis of various neuro-cognitive, biological, 
anthropological, and psychoanaytic discourses and prac-
tices10—are probably (and as elaborated above) desire, 
discipline, and jouissance (with various associated terms 
never far behind, such as love, enjoyment, wonder, beau-
ty, excess, sublimity, feeling, sentience, affect, violence, 
pain, anxiety, loss, separation, suffering, trauma, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Although it has to be noted here that Fradenburg’s longstand-
ing romance and companionship with Chaucer never ends, and 
as she wrote in her recent essay “Beauty and Boredom in the 
Legend of Good Women,” much of her work has been concerned 
with seeing more clearly the tragic side of Chaucer’s work, while 
also attending to its therapeutic comedy (Fradenburg 2010, 74; 
see also Fradenburg 1999). This resonates with Fradenburg’s 
own writings which, although resolutely insistent on the neces-
sity of enjoyment, feeling, pleasure, and aliveness (on, frankly, 
refusing to let go of our desires or to have them “disciplined” 
away by various Others, to stop moving—which is to say, to stop 
living), are also everywhere suffused with the notice and marks 
of melancholic longing, “angsting,” the various endangerments 
of vulnerability, and the spectres of loss, mourning, and death. 
Her work thus possesses a dark and complex beauty that (thank-
fully) does not lend itself to easy calculations. See, especially, in 
this vein, Fradenburg (2009). 
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death, among others), which in turn are always related to 
“techniques of living” (Fradenburg 2002b, 4, 9). In es-
sence, no matter which text of hers we might be reading, 
Fradenburg seems to be always talking about something 
she says more explicitly in “Group Time: Catastrophe, 
Periodicity, Survival,” where she wrote that “enjoyment is 
the matrix of knowledge, and knowledge is not dimin-
ished thereby.” Further, “Interpretation and explanation 
are activities central to libidinal structuration and vice 
versa. . . . We thereby reclaim our technical work [the 
humanities, for example] as the work of desire, and desire 
as that which makes the world” (Fradenburg 2002a, 
232).11  
 There is probably no better introduction than the 
lines cited above to the current work you are now holding 
in your hands (or viewing on a retina or liquid display 
screen), which joins a growing body of work on the 
state(s) of the University, best described as critical self-
reflections and public intellectual polemics on the state(s) 
of higher education by those who know it very well from 
firsthand experience, either as tenured professors, college 
administrators, adjunct instructors, or graduate students 
and members of the ever-growing academic precariat12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In this respect, I see real affinities and important (heretofore 
un-noted) linkages between Fradenburg’s thinking and that of 
Jane Bennett in her book The Enchantment of Modern Life 
(2001), especially with regard to Bennett’s argument in that 
work that the will to social justice is “sustained by periodic 
bouts of being enamored with existence.” Further, “[a]ffective 
fascination with a world thought to be worthy of it may help to 
ward off the existential resentment that plagues mortals, that is, 
the sense of victimization that recurrently descends upon the 
tragic (or absurd or incomplete) beings called human.” Ulti-
mately, for Bennett, “one of the tasks proper to ethics is to en-
joy the world” (Bennett 2001, 12, 13). 
12 Aaron Bady springs most notably to mind in this latter cate-
gory—see his collected writings at his zunguzungu blog at The 
New Inquiry: http://thenewinquiry.com/blogs/zunguzungu/—although it 
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(occasionally critiques of the university also come from 
think tanks and policy institutes, mainstream journalism, 
cultural criticism, and the like). These reflections can be 
narrow-mindedly conservative—Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the 
American Mind (1987) and Dinesh D’Souza’s Illiberal Ed-
ucation (1991) spring to mind, as does David Horwitz’s 
The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in 
America (2006)—or they can be more progressively liber-
al, such as Marc Bousquet’s How the University Works 
(2008), which addresses labor inequities in higher educa-
tion; Derek Bok’s Universities in the Marketplace (2003), 
which outlines the commercialization of the university 
and its disciplines; Christopher Newfield’s Unmaking the 
Public University (2011), which shows how unequal ac-
cess to higher education for Americans is a result of con-
servative campaigns to thwart the university’s democra-
tizing functions; and Benjamin Ginsberg’s The Fall of the 
Faculty (2011), which demonstrates the detriments to 
higher education that have been caused by the rise of “all-
administrative” universities, just to name some of the 
more notable examples of the past ten or so years.13  
 The most compelling and philosophically provocative 
work in this vein up until now, for me, has been Bill 
Readings’ The University in Ruins (published two years 
after Readings’ untimely death in 1994), partly because it 
offers a vision of a university-to-come (or an always un-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should be noted that in the past five or so years there has been a 
veritable explosion of weblogs authored by graduate students and post-
grads, contingent faculty, and members of the academic precariat 
that are focused on what might be called the ills and travails of 
higher education and the increasing lack of equitable access to 
the university, whether as student or faculty member. 
13 And in the vein of horrifically depressing accounts of the dis-
mantling of public higher education, by way of the UK system, 
especially in terms of access, quality of instruction, and research 
funding, see McGettigan (2013), and for the implications of 
what is happening in the UK for US system, see Newfield’s 
(2013) review of McGettigan’s book. 
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realized-yet-possible institution) that I feel I can believe 
in and work on behalf of, and with which Fradenburg’s 
current work has no little solidarity. In his book, Read-
ings argued that, partly due to certain processes of trans-
national globalization, whereby “the rule of the cash nex-
us” has replaced “the notion of national identity as a de-
terminant in all aspects of social life,” the University (cap-
italized to indicate its historical status as an idealized institu-
tion) has become a “transnational bureaucratic corporation” 
and “the centrality of the traditional humanistic disci-
plines to the life of the University is no longer assured” 
(Readings 1996, 3). Because “the grand narrative of the 
University, centered on the production of a liberal, rea-
soning subject, is no longer available to us,” it is “no long-
er the case that we can conceive the University within the 
historical horizon of its self-realization” (Readings 1996, 
9, 5). Readings prefers the term “post-historical” over 
“postmodern” for the contemporary University, “in order 
to insist on the sense that the institution has outlived it-
self, is now a survivor of the era in which it defined itself 
in terms of the project of the historical development, af-
firmation, and inculcation of national culture” (Readings 
1996, 6; his emphasis). Ultimately, the University is “a 
ruined institution, one that lost its historical raison 
d'etre,” but which nevertheless “opens up a space in which 
it is possible to think the notion of community otherwise, 
without recourse to notions of unity, consensus, and 
communication” (Readings 1996, 19, 20; his emphasis). 
This is a space, moreover, where the University “becomes 
one site among others where the question of being-
together is raised, raised with an urgency that proceeds 
from the absence of the institutional forms (such as the 
nation-state), which have historically served to mask that 
question” (Readings 1996, 20). 
 Indeed, the University, however “ruined,” must strive, 
in Readings’ view, toward building a “community that is 
not made up of subjects but singularities”: this communi-
ty would not be “organic in that its members do not share 
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an immanent identity to be revealed,” and it would not be 
“directed toward the production of a universal subject of 
history, to the cultural realization of an essential human 
nature” (Readings 1996, 185). Rather, this would be a 
community “of dissensus that presupposes nothing in com-
mon,” and that “would seek to make its heteronomy, its 
differences, more complex” (Readings 1996, 190). In this 
scenario, the post-historical University would be “where 
thought takes place beside thought, where thinking is a 
shared process without identity or unity”—this is ulti-
mately “a dissensual process; it belongs to dialogism ra-
ther than to dialogue,” and instead of a new interdiscipli-
nary space that would reunify the increasingly frag-
mented disciplines, there would be a “shifting disciplinary 
structure that holds open the question of whether and 
how thoughts fit together” (Readings 1996, 192). 
 Readings’ thinking accords well with Derrida’s in his 
essay “The University Without Condition,” where Derri-
da argued for a “new humanities” and “unconditional 
university” that would “remain an ultimate place of criti-
cal resistance—and more than critical—to all the powers 
of dogmatic and unjust appropriation” (Derrida 2002, 
204). This unconditional university, further, would pro-
vide harbor for “the principal right to say everything, 
even if it be under the heading of fiction and the experi-
mentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, 
to publish it” (Derrida 2002, 205). The humanities would 
have a privileged place in this unconditional university, 
because the very principle of unconditionality “has an 
originary and privileged place of presentation, of manifes-
tation, of safekeeping in the Humanities. It has there its 
space of discussion and reelaboration as well” (Derrida 
2002, 207). 
 Although Readings’ argument in The University in 
Ruins has been subject to carefully considered counter-
critique,14 it remains today, I would argue, a powerful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example, LaCapra (1998), where he argues that the 
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spur to thought and action for those of us working within 
or on behalf of the public university who are concerned 
with the future of humanistic teaching and scholarship, 
and with the increasing numbers of persons who are be-
ing treated as the “bare life” of the academy—our non-
tenure-track instructors, for example, but also our stu-
dents. These are also the lives for which we must “take 
care.” While Readings gave us a highly trenchant critique 
of the ways in which the American university has become 
a transnational bureaucratic-managerial corporation, thus dis-
rupting and weakening the role of traditional humanistic dis-
ciplines (and we might pause to consider how prescient 
he was), more importantly, he also suggested ways in 
which this situation might (perversely? positively?) open 
new (heterotopic and post-historical) spaces “in which it 
is possible to think the notion of community otherwise”: 
this community would not be “organic in that its mem-
bers do not share an immanent identity to be revealed,” 
and it would not be “directed toward the production of a 
universal subject of history, to the cultural realization of 
an essential human nature” (Readings 1996, 185). One 
might argue (and I will) that Readings’ ultimate hope for 
the University as a space in which the question of “being-
together” and disciplinarity itself would be permanently en-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contemporary American academy is not as much a “transna-
tional bureaucratic corporation” as it “is based on a systematic, 
schizoid division between a market model and a model of cor-
porate solidarity and collegial responsibility” (LaCapra 1998, 
32). Further, LaCapra argues that Readings’ insistence on the 
fact that “the older ideals of culture, Bildung, the liberal subject-
citizen, and the nation-state are no longer relevant” in the con-
temporary academy belies the fact, in LaCapra’s view, that these 
things were always phantasms or idealizations, “made to cover a 
much more complex and changing constellation of forces that 
varied with nation, region, and group” (LaCapra 1998, 38, 39). 
LaCapra also wonders, “with respect to the present,” if “culture, 
ideology, and the nation-state are as evacuated or obsolete as Readings 
believes” (39). See also Royle (1999) and LaCapra (1999). 
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tangled and left purposefully open and unsettled, and where we 
would work to make our heteronomic differences more 
complex, has never really been put into serious practice. 
It would be too open-ended, of course, too experimental, 
risky, and perhaps, non-practical (and really messy in 
terms of administration), and yet, nothing strikes me as 
so necessary. Happily, Fradenburg’s new work takes up 
the mantle of Readings’ hope and extends it with im-
portant new research and reflection on the importance of 
the humanities’ role in the arts of intersubjectivity so crit-
ical for making anything happen at all, and for a vision of 
the university as a shared (if dissensual) enterprise. 
 A lot has happened since Readings’ book was pub-
lished—his critique certainly appears dead-accurate and 
the “ruinous” situation he sketched, especially in terms of 
the university’s corporate-managerial structure and the 
concomitant assaults on the humanities, has intensified. 
And since the financial crises of 2008 onward, the idea 
(long-valued) that the university should be an important 
public (and publicly-funded) concern, especially for its 
vital role in securing various forms of social egalitarian-
ism and a broad-based meritocracy for the greatest num-
bers of persons possible (not to mention, in order to en-
hance cognitive and technical innovations of all varieties, 
for the pure advancement of knowledge and practices of 
making, regardless of cost-based outcomes), no longer 
appears to be either viable or what might be termed a 
common concern. All across the country, states are slash-
ing university budgets and expecting institutions of high-
er education to figure out more and more ways to pay for 
themselves, and to be “profitable,” whatever that might 
mean—MOOCs, or Massive Open Online Courses, are 
one prominent and lamentable outcome of this type of 
thinking (see, for example, Bady 2013a). This may be an 
oversimplification (because I can't do justice in this Prel-
ude to all of the myriad examples in Fradenburg’s book, 
which itself supplies plenty), but let’s just say that the 
foregoing state of affairs has led to all sorts of jockeying 
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within the university today to both winnow down and/or 
eliminate disciplines that appear non-utilitarian or to 
dress up traditionally philosophical disciplines (such as 
literary studies) in more utilitarian and applications-
based clothing. In addition, protocols of oversight and 
accountability have intensified to the point of leaving 
faculty little time and room to actually do the work they 
were hired to do: teach and research and mentor, and 
direct and innovate their own curricula and disciplinary 
collaborations. Most harmful of all, and in direct propor-
tion to the budget-slashing maneuvers of state legislatures 
(and the dearth of progressive federal amelioration of 
such), tuition and student debt levels are at unsustainably 
crippling levels, and the ranks of tenure-track faculty 
have shrunk to something around thirty percent of all 
teaching positions (see, for example, June 2012 and Edi-
tors 2012). 
 The university system in the state of California, where 
Fradenburg works as a professor of English, clinical psy-
choanalyst, and educational activist, has represented an 
important battleground in this current situation, partly 
because the state’s economic woes have been so severe 
since 2008 (and more importantly, because of Governor 
Jerry Brown’s and former UC President Mark Yudof's 
dismantling of the UC Master Plan, whereby all eligible 
California citizens had been entitled to a place within the 
University of California, regardless of means),15 but also because 
the state has long been internationally admired for its 
public research institutions (their quality and also their 
broad access) and also has a long and enduring history of 
faculty and student activism on behalf of the notion of a 
free, open, democratic, and public university.16 Fraden-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See “Brown and Yudof Bail on the Master Plan,” KeepCalifor-
niasPromise.org, July 1, 2012: http://keepcaliforniaspromise.org 
/2628/brown-and-yudof-bail-on-the-master-plan. 
16 See, for recent examples, Bady (2013b), Michael Meranze and 
Christopher Newfield’s blog Remaking the University (http:// 
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burg herself has long been an outspoken activist on behalf 
of the public humanities (and against administrative mal-
feasance in all of its guises), but she has been extremely 
busy since 2008 helping to organize and lead critical and 
activist interventions within the UC system: she founded 
the group ‘Saving UCSB’ and organized a faculty walkout 
at UC-Santa Barbara in 2009, and among many other 
activities too numerous to mention here, she is a tireless 
letter writer and public speaker on behalf of academic 
freedom, the value of the humanities, and the importance 
of open access to public higher education.  
 Thus we are fortunate that Fradenburg has decided to 
devote an entire monograph, Staying Alive, to an insight-
ful and laser-like diagnosis of the various neoliberal and 
technocratic forces currently assailing and undermining 
the public university, and to a fierce polemic on behalf of 
the humanities as the critical site for fostering forms of 
artfulness critical to the future of the keeping open of the 
question of our “being-together,” both within the institu-
tion and outside of it. And she has generously decided to 
publish it with an open-access and para-academic press 
(punctum books), because she agrees (thankfully) that 
work within the humanities, and especially public intel-
lectual work, needs to have the widest purchase possible 
upon the public commons and should not be kept locked 
behind corporatized and other paywalls. And in the spirit 
of collaboration that we at punctum and the BABEL 
Working Group certainly hold dear, she has crafted the 
book to include companion “fugue” essays by myself (this 
Prelude), Donna Beth Ellard, Ruth Evans, Julie Orleman-
ski, Daniel C. Remein, and Michael D. Snediker, so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
utotherescue.blogspot.com/), Robert Samuels’s blog Changing 
Universities (http://changinguniversities.blogspot.com/), and California 
Scholars for Academic Freedom (http://cascholars4academicfreedom. 
wordpress.com/), just to cite a few examples of UC’s robust 
student and faculty advocacy and activism on behalf of the pub-
lic university. 
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the book is part-scholarly monograph, part-poetic-activist 
desiring-assemblage. The four chapters by Fradenburg can be 
read as a complete book (or “monograph”), and they can 
be read individually as stand-alone, broadsheet-style po-
lemics. Each “fugue” chapter can be read in tandem with 
the chapter by Fradenburg to which it responds—a work 
in “two voices,” as it were—or as a “flight” that “chases” 
after Fradenburg’s thought, or as a well-lit “connecting 
passage” between the small yet expansive “rooms” (the 
“stanzas”) of her thought (all associated meanings of 
“fugue,” in music and beyond). Similar to what Deleuze 
and Guattari said about their work together, “Since each 
of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. . . . We 
have been aided, inspired, multiplied” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 3, 4). Again, this book is “an assemblage. It 
has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and 
never has been” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5). Rather, 
this is a (loving) labor of becoming-world. 
 Ultimately, and as outlined in detail above, Staying 
Alive—as a labor of public intellectual advocacy for the 
humanities, and the public university more largely—does 
not represent a departure for Fradenburg’s oeuvre, for 
she has always been concerned with defining and valuing 
the work (and importantly, the jouissance) of the liberal 
arts against the “order[s] of utility.” To briefly revisit her 
book Sacrifice Your Love, in the Epilogue to that work, 
Fradenburg discussed the importance of resisting, from 
within the humanities, the “utilitarian rhetorics that sus-
tain the jouissance of capitalism,” and she urged us to take 
up 
 
the question of the jouissance of the academy, ra-
ther than assuming it is our task to discipline joui-
ssance out of the academy. For one thing, we can-
not discipline jouissance out of the academy, be-
cause discipline is always permeated with enjoy-
ment. So why give ground on our enjoyment? (Fraden-
burg 2002b, 247) 
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Why, indeed? In fact, in her more recent forays into cog-
nitive studies, animal behavioral research, neuroscience, 
evolutionary biology, biosemiotics, and the like (all of 
which disciplines inform the arguments of this book, 
along with psychoanalysis and literary-historical analysis, 
and cultural critique), Fradenburg has amassed an in-
credible body of scientific and other evidence for why we 
should not only not “give ground” on this enjoyment 
(with all of its positive and negative implications—i.e., 
enjoyment is a messy affair but no less necessary for life 
as a result), but also for the ways in which living itself is 
an art and the humanities provide the deepest reservoir of 
the non-utilitarian, excessive, ornamental artfulness so 
necessary, not just for surviving, but for thriving in this 
world. Contrary to recent polemics that simply urge the 
humanities to become more scientistic or technology-
focused, to demonstrate their utility or even trophy their 
uselessness, Staying Alive does something remarkably dif-
ferent: it argues for the humanism of a new scientific par-
adigm based on complexity theory and holistic and eco-
logical approaches to knowledge-making. It urges us to 
take the further step of realizing not only that we can 
promote and enhance neuroplastic connectivity and so-
cial-emotional cognition, but also that the humanities 
have always already been doing so. In this sense, Fraden-
burg’s work and thought exemplifies what Michael O’Rourke 
has called a queerly “roguish relationality” that is open to 
“an infinite series of [disciplinary] encounters,” which is 
also an opening to futurity (O’Rourke 2006, 36). 
 As Fradenburg writes in this volume, “Nature always 
exceeds itself in its expressivity”—which is to say artful-
ness is necessary for adaptation and innovation, for forg-
ing rich and varied relationships with other minds, bodies 
and things, and thus, again, for thriving—whether in the 
boardroom or the art gallery, the biology lab or the re-
cording studio, the alley or the playground, the book or 
the dream. Bringing together psychoanalysis, science, aes-
thetics, and premodern literature (from Virgil to Cha-
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ucer to Shakespeare), Fradenburg offers a bracing polem-
ic against the technocrats of higher education and a vi-
brant new vision for the humanities as both living art and 
new life science. For me, especially, the book matters so 
profoundly, because—even if not overtly—it takes up and 
further exemplifies the necessity of Bill Readings’ vision 
of the university as a critical site for play, for non-util-
itarian experimentation, for keeping knowledge unset-
tled, where, in Readings’ words (again), “thinking is a 
shared process without identity or unity.” And it further 
exemplifies the case for the critical value of the type(s) of 
intersubjectivity crafted through artful processes of signi-
fication that I really believe are the only route out of the 
greed, selfishness, fear of the Other, and violence that 
currently grips our world. And thus Fradenburg’s work 
also shares with Leo Bersani a deep and abiding invest-
ment in the question of whether the work of art might be 
able to “deploy signs of the subject in the world that are 
not signs of interpretation or of an object-destroying joui-
ssance, signs of . . . correspondences of forms within a 
universal solidarity of being” (Bersani 2010, 142). 
 What this book also demonstrates—along with the 
important body of work known as “university studies” 
that this book now joins—is that those of us who work 
within the humanities must commit some of our most 
valuable resources (primarily, our always-encroached-upon 
time, and some part of our inner emotional lives) to academic 
activism, whether through letter writing, blog polemics, 
organized protests and strikes, collectivist agitation and 
intervention, mutual aid initiatives, and books such as 
these. We cannot just bide our time within the university, 
hoping things will get better, or even assuming they will 
(“all storms pass” is what many people seem to believe). 
The powers-that-be always want you to be patient and 
wait for things they never intend to give you (Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.’s “Letter From Birmingham Jail” never ceas-
es to be instructive on this point). As long as we have 
shelter of any kind, and are willing to make room in that 
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shelter for those more vulnerable than we are, there is no 
reason to wait. Do we want to know what kind of univer-
sity we want? Let us simply enunciate our institutional 
and disciplinary desires, as this book does, and in make-
shift shelters. We are in Lear’s company now, and we 
have to seize hold of the university—as an institution, but 
also as a public trust—as our concern, and we must be 
willing to fight for that concern. As Julie Orlemanski 
writes in her contribution to this volume, 
 
Academic-activist writings not only deliver dis-
patches from the numerous battlegrounds of high-
er education. They also call upon those who care 
to read them—those who might defend the insti-
tutional homes of speculation, imagination, and 
historical understanding. These writings are the 
communiques that circulate within the “army of 
lovers” and also pass beyond them, to unpresup-
posed outposts and new readers. . . . mobilizing re-
flections about learning in the present. 
 
THE SPACE IN WHICH WE LIVE, WHICH DRAWS US OUT OF 
OURSELVES, IN WHICH THE EROSION OF OUR LIVES, OUR 
TIME AND OUR HISTORY OCCURS, THE SPACE THAT CLAWS 
AND GNAWS AT US . . . A HETEROGENEOUS SPACE 
 
In some sense, this book constructs what Hakim Bey 
called a “temporary autonomous zone”: a site where some 
of us might gather (as authors and readers, friends and 
strangers, teachers and students, lovers and fighters) to 
practice our work as rogue agents in search of new means 
for the development of a certain institutional amour fou 
and “clockless nowever,” a “politics of dream, urgent as 
the blueness of the sky” (Bey 1985). The fact of the matter 
is—whether we inhabit student desks, tenure lines, ad-
junct positions, or post-/never-graduate, somewhere-other-
than-here positions—now might be the time to take a bit 
more seriously the development of new and alternative 
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spaces (both within and without the university) for learn-
ing, for inquiry, and for knowledge-culture production. It 
turns out (and didn't we already know this?) that the fu-
ture actually has to be constructed, and let’s remind our-
selves that this is the work of the present, and we need to 
enlarge our scope of collaboration beyond our specific 
institutions (if we have institutional homes), beyond our 
disciplines, beyond our so-called position and rank (fac-
ulty vs. adjunct, professor vs. student, etc.), and beyond 
the University proper. The real University should com-
prise everyone who wants to be a part of it, whether or 
not they have an official position or desk. And it will be in 
this work—the present-ing of the future, the future-ing of 
the present—that we will manifest ourselves. For this vol-
ume of Fradenburg’s is also a collective manifesto, and it 
is to manifesting ourselves (making ourselves more pre-
sent to each other, which is to also say, more responsible 
to each other) in some sort of collective endeavor that 
works on behalf of the future without laying any posses-
sive claims upon it, that we might craft new spaces for the 
University-at-large, which is also a University that wan-
ders, that is never just somewhere, dwelling in the parti-
tive—of a particular place—but rather, seeks to be every-
where, always on the move, pandemic, uncontainable, 
and yes, precarious, always at risk, while always being 
present/between us (manifest). At the same time, we insist 
on perversely-hopefully laying claim to specific institu-
tions and subject areas—the University of California, or 
premodern studies, for example—as collocations of ob-
jects and trajectories of thought that we desire to hold 
close to us, while also placing them in certain perpetual 
tensions with everything else (even ourselves).  
 Manifestos can be hackneyed, and even dangerous, 
especially when they assume a ground-clearing maneuver 
(i.e., whatever exists now must be destroyed to make way 
for the new), but I think we increasingly need them, be-
cause they help us to outline our commitments and de-
sires in a writerly action that presences those commit-
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ments and desires. That is Step 1. Step 2 would be doing 
something about it, and here again Fradenburg’s career, 
as scholar, public intellectual, and activist, is exemplary. 
In the manifesto (albeit, the manifesto that does not de-
sire the violence of erasing the past or the Other), we ex-
press in an always-fleeting yet still phenomenologically 
palpable present a radical form of desire that seeks an 
alteration of the status quo, and while the manifesto often 
looks silly and hyperbolic and always unaware of the de-
mise of its (vain?) hopes in the future (the retrospective-
melancholic view), there is something sincere about it. It 
presents a radical opening to (or window upon) the risk 
of a fragile yet necessary honesty. We could do worse 
than to be honest with each other. We could do worse 
than to actually want things that we haven’t been told in 
advance to want. This is also a matter of contributing to 
the political imaginary that some believe is withering 
away (see, for example, Srnicek and Williams 2013 and 
Wark 2013). This volume is an important contribution, I 
want to argue, to the political imaginary. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Is it possible that “heterotopia” might be one term (or 
route) by which to rethink the space of the university as 
both “closed” and productively “open” to alternative knowledge 
practices, inventive lives, and new relational modes that 
would allow us to take care—of ourselves, of others, and 
of this fragile institution we call a university, that has no 
little relation to the world? For Foucault, who coined the 
term, a heterotopia (which might be a psychiatric hospi-
tal, a cemetery, a mirror, a theater, a colony, a museum, a 
brothel, a library, a garden, and I will say, a university) “is 
capable of juxtaposing in a single real space several spac-
es, several sites that are themselves incompatible,” and 
thus opens onto “heterochrony” (Foucault 1986, 25, 26). Fur-
ther, heterotopias “always presuppose a system of opening 
and closing that both isolates them,” but also “makes 
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them penetrable” (Foucault 1986, 26). The university 
seems an apt example in Foucault’s schema, for it both 
exists apart (in some important respects) from the na-
tions, provinces, and cities within which it resides, as a 
sort of independent “colony,” and also comprises within 
itself separate spheres, or little other worlds—departments, 
schools, disciplines, and the like. In addition, because of its 
geographical placement, often either directly within ur-
ban centers or adjacent to them, and also its public func-
tions, the university is somewhat permeable to the Out-
side, while also performing certain gatekeeping functions 
(these are lamentable, I might add). It is both set apart, 
comprising its own miniature heteroverses, and also wo-
ven into the fabric of the polis, which it reflects, like a 
cracked mirror. 
 Perhaps, like Foucault’s favorite example of a hetero-
topia, the ship—even the pirate ship—the university might be 
reconceptualized as “a floating piece of space, a place with-
out a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself 
and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the 
sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from 
brothel to brothel” goes in search of “the most precious 
treasures”—in short, the university as “the greatest re-
serve of the imagination,” the heterotopia par excellence, 
without which, as Fradenburg demonstrates here in this 
volume, “dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of ad-
venture, and the police take the place of pirates” (Fou-
cault 1986, 27). In which case, let us set sail. 
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